Topic: Ethical NaturalismW 3:10-6:00 @ 2275 SS&H |
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University of California-Davis Pekka Väyrynen |
This seminar will survey contemporary work on ethical naturalism, which I understand primarily as the view that ethical properties fall into the category of natural properties. Ethical naturalism is a form of ethical realism, the view that ethics is a domain of robustly objective fact. The topic lies at the intersection of several central issues in the past century of meta-ethics. We begin with G. E. Moore's (in)famous "open question argument" against analytical naturalism and then discuss contemporary forms of analytic naturalism and reductive and non-reductive synthetic naturalism. We'll consider different accounts of natural properties, the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral, and debates about whether there are correct "moral explanations". We'll also consider recent non-naturalist critiques of ethical naturalism, as well as arguments that a broadly naturalistic worldview better supports ethical anti-realism than naturalistic ethical realism and the question whether ethical naturalism can adequately capture normativity. |
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As a student in this seminar, you are expected to do the assigned reading and participate actively in class. Other requirements are:
All readings are available either online or in a folder at the Philosophy Department copy room (1243 SS&H Bldg.). You will find a link to each online text in the schedule below. Accessing most of the online readings requires institutional access via UCD server. If you use a non-UCD ISP, you need to set your browser to a proxy server (instructions here). For most sessions, there will be more to read than we will probably get through. Each week, I will try to indicate more precisely which of the next week's readings will be the more important ones. We may also find good reasons to revise our schedule as we go on. |
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Pekka Väyrynen: "Moral Realism", forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Second Edition (Macmillan, 2005). |
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G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica, revised edition (Cambridge UP, 1993), 53-73, 88-93, 1-19. |
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William Frankena: "The Naturalistic Fallacy", Mind 48 (1939), 464-477. |
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Russ Shafer-Landau: Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford UP, 2003), 55-79. |
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Frank Jackson: From Metaphysics to Ethics, (Oxford UP, 1998), 117-29, 140-44, 150-53. |
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Peter Railton: "Facts and Values", in Facts, Values, and Norms (Cambridge UP, 2003), 43-68. |
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Gilbert Harman: "Ethics and Observation", The Nature of Morality (Oxford UP, 1977), 1-10. |
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David O. Brink: Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge UP, 1989), 156-67, 172-80, 190-97. |
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Mark Timmons: Morality Without Foundations (Oxford UP, 1999), 56-70. |
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Peter Railton: "Naturalism and Prescriptivity", Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1989), 151-74. |
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David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: "Naturalism and Normativity", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 77 (2003), 23-45. |
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Last updated 27 August 2006