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Papers in Meta-ethics

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I have organized my publications in meta-ethics into a few categories, to simplify finding things, and within the categories I list the most recent publications first.  I provide an overall list of my publications in meta-ethics at the bottom of the page.  Some of my papers are linked to PDFs, some of which are password protected.  The password is "copp".

The Society-Centered Theory

Pluralist-Teleology

Realist-Expressivism and Hybrid Theories

Practical Reason and Self-Grounded Reason

Normativity and the Authority of Morality

Motivational Internalism

Moral Naturalism

Moral Twin-Earth

Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Ought Implies Can

Overall List

 

The Society-Centered Theory

 

  • 2011:  “Do Animals Have Fundamental Moral Standing?” in Thomas L. Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, eds., Oxford Handbook of Animals and Ethics (New York:  Oxford University Press), pp. 276-303.
  • 2009:  “Is Society-Centered Moral Theory a Contemporary Version of Natural Law Theory?” Dialogue, 48, pp. 19-36.
  • 2008:  “Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism,” Philosophical Issues, 18, pp. 184-204.
  • 2007:  Morality in a Natural World:  Selected Essays in Metaethics (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press).
  • 2007:  "Introduction," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 1-30.
  • 2007:  "Moral Naturalism and Self-Evident Moral Truths," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 93-112.
  • 2007:  "Moral Necessities in a Contingent World," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 113-150.
  • 2005:  “A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism,” Philosophical Studies,126, pp. 269-283.
  • 2005:  “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt:  Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45.  Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 1998:  “Morality and Society - The True and the Nasty: Reply to Leist,” Analyse und Kritik, 20, pp. 30-45.
  • 1998:  “Reasons and Societies: Kurt Baier’s The Rational and the Moral Order”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, pp. 96-102.
  • 1997:  “Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society?” Analyse und Kritik, 19, pp. 189-212.
  • 1996:  “Moral Knowledge in Society-Centered Moral Theory”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, eds., Moral Knowledge? (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 243-266.
  • 1996:  “Moral Skepticism,” in Donald M. Borchert, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement, (New York: Macmillan), pp. 364-365.
  • 1995.  Morality, Normativity, and Society (New York: Oxford University Press; paperback edition 2001).
  • 1992:  "The 'Possibility' of a Categorical Imperative:  Kant's Groundwork, Part III", Philosophical Perspectives, 6, 261-284.
  • 1992:  "The Concept of Society", Dialogue, 31, pp. 184-212.

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Pluralist-Teleology

 

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Realist-Expressivism and Hybrid Theories

 

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Practical Reason and Self-Grounded Reason

 

  • 2005:  “The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy , 22, pp. 165-203.  Also ch. 10 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 2002:  “Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon’s Rationalistic Moral Psychology”, Social Theory and Practice, 28, pp. 243-276.  Co-authored with David Sobel.
  • 2002:  “Gert on Reasons, Rationality, Harms, and Lists”, in Walter Sinnott_Armstrong and Robert Audi, eds. Rationality, Rules, And Ideals:  Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory, (Totowa, N.J.:  Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 91-110.
  • 2001:  “Against Internalism About Reasons – Gert’s Rational Options”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, pp. 455-461.
  • 2001:  “Rationality, Autonomy, and Basic Needs”, in Neil Roughley, ed., Being Humans, (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 334-355.
  • 2001:  “Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire”, Analysis, 61, pp. 44-53.  Co-authored with David Sobel.
  • 1993:  "Reason and Needs", in R.G. Frey and Christopher Morris, eds., Value, Welfare, and Morality (Cambridge University Press), pp. 112-137.

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Normativity and the Authority of Morality

 

  • 2010:  “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” in Samuel Black and Evan Tiffany, eds., Reasons to be Moral Revisited, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33, pp. 97-130.
  • 2010:  “Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness,” in Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, eds., A World Without Values:  Essays on John Mackie’s Error Theory (Berlin:  Springer), pp. 141-165.
  • 2010:  Review of Normativity, by Judith Jarvis Thomson, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89, pp. 180-183.
  • 2009:  “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philosophical Issues, 19, pp. 21-37.
  • 2006:  Review of Ethics and the A Priori:  Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-ethics, by Michael Smith, in Mind, 115, pp. 476-481.
  • 2005:  “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt:  Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45.  Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 1997:  “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 14, pp. 86-106.  Also ch. 9 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 1991:  "Moral Realism:  Facts and Norms", Ethics, 101, pp. 610-624.
  • 1991:  "Moral Skepticism", Philosophical Studies, 62, pp. 203-233.
  • 1990:  "Normativity and the Very Idea of Moral Epistemology", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29, Supplement - 1990 Spindel Conference, pp. 189-210.
  • 1990:  "Contractarianism and Moral Skepticism", in Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice:  Essays on Gauthier (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press), pp. 196-228.
  • 1990:  "Explanation and Justification in Ethics", Ethics, 100, pp 237-258.
  • 1989:  Review of Morals by Agreement by David Gauthier, in The Philosophical Review , 98, pp 411-414.
  • 1984:  "Introduction", in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason and Truth:  New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics (Totowa, N.J.:  Rowman and Allanheld), pp 1-24.
  • See also papers on Pluralist-Teleology.

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Motivational Internalism

 

  • 1997:  “Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith’s, The Moral Problem”, Ethics, 108, pp. 33-54.
  • 1995:  “Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation”, in Kai Nielsen and Jocyelyne Couture, eds., On the Relevance of Metaethics:  New Essays on Metaethics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supp. vol. 21, pp. 187-219.
  • 1982:  "Harman on Internalism, Relativism and Logical Form", Ethics, 92, pp 227-242.

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Moral Naturalism

 

  • 2012:  “Is Constructivism an Alternative to Moral Realism?” in Carla Bagnoli, ed., Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press).
  • 2012:  “Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 8 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press).
  • 2012:  “Varieties of Moral Naturalism,” Filosofia Unisinos.
  • 2012:  “Normativity and Reasons:  Five Arguments from Parfit Against Normative Naturalism,” in Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, eds., Ethical Naturalism:  Current Debates (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press), pp. 24-57.
  • 2011:  “Prinz’s Subjectivist Moral Realism:  Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals,” Nous, 45, pp. 577-594.
  • 2007:  "Referring to Moral Properties:  Moral Twin Earth, Again," Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 230-245.
  • 2006:  “The Ontology of Putnam’s Ethics Without Ontology ,” Contemporary Pragmatism , 3, pp. 39-53.
  • 2005:  “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt:  Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45.  Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 2003:  “Why Naturalism?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6, pp. 179-200.  Also ch. 1 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 2001:  “Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism:  Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 26, pp. 31-74.  Also ch. 2 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 2000:  “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth,” Synthèse, 124, pp. 113-137.  Also ch. 6 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 1999:  “Korsgaard on Normativity, Identity, and the Grounds of Obligation”, in Julian Nida-Rumelin, ed., Rationality, Realism, Revision (Berlin:  de Gruyter), pp. 572-581.
  • 1994:  Review of Moral Reasons by Jonathan Dancy, in Philosophical Books, 35, pp. 197-199.
  • 1991:  "Moral Realism:  Facts and Norms", Ethics, 101, pp. 610-624.
  • 1990:  "Explanation and Justification in Ethics", Ethics, 100, pp 237-258.

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Moral Twin-Earth

 

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Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Ought Implies Can

 

  • 2008:  “’Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” Analysis, 68.1, pp. 67-75.
  • 2003:  “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, Blameworthiness, and Alternate Possibilities”, in David Widerker and Michael McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Press), pp. 265-299.
  • 1997:  “Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility”, Nous, 31, pp. 441-456.

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Overall List

 

  • 2012:  “Is Constructivism an Alternative to Moral Realism?” in Carla Bagnoli, ed., Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press).
  • 2012:  “Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 8 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press).
  • 2012:  “Varieties of Moral Naturalism,” Filosofia Unisinos.
  • 2012:  “Normativity and Reasons:  Five Arguments from Parfit Against Normative Naturalism,” in Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, eds., Ethical Naturalism:  Current Debates (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press), pp. 24-57.
  • 2011:  “Do Animals Have Fundamental Moral Standing?” in Thomas L. Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, eds., Oxford Handbook of Animals and Ethics (New York:  Oxford University Press), pp. 276-303.
  • 2011:  “Prinz’s Subjectivist Moral Realism:  Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals,” Nous, 45, pp. 577-594.
  • 2010:  “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” in Samuel Black and Evan Tiffany, eds., Reasons to be Moral Revisited, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33, pp. 97-130.
  • 2010:  “Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness,” in Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, eds., A World Without Values:  Essays on John Mackie’s Error Theory (Berlin:  Springer), pp. 141-165.
  • 2010:  Review of Normativity, by Judith Jarvis Thomson, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89, pp. 180-183.
  • 2009:  “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philosophical Issues, 19, pp. 21-37.
  • 2009:  “Is Society-Centered Moral Theory a Contemporary Version of Natural Law Theory?” Dialogue, 48, pp. 19-36.
  • 2008:  “Do We Have Any Justified Moral Beliefs?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77, pp. 811-819.
  • 2008:  “Realist-Expressivism and Conventional Implicature,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 4 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press), pp. 167-202.
  • 2008:  “’Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” Analysis, 68.1, pp. 67-75.
  • 2008:  “Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism,” Philosophical Issues, 18, pp. 184-204.
  • 2007:  Morality in a Natural World:  Selected Essays in Metaethics (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press).
  • 2007:  "Introduction," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 1-30.
  • 2007:  "Moral Naturalism and Self-Evident Moral Truths," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 93-112.
  • 2007:  "Moral Necessities in a Contingent World," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 113-150.
  • 2007:  "Referring to Moral Properties:  Moral Twin Earth, Ag ain," Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 230-245.
  • 2007:  “Autonomy and the Social Construction of Values,” in Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson and Dan Egonsson, Hommage à Wlodek -  Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz (electronic publication at <http://www.fil.lu.se/HommageaWlodek/site/abstra.htm>).
  • 2006:  “The Ontology of Putnam’s Ethics Without Ontology,” Contemporary Pragmatism, 3, pp. 39-53.
  • 2006:  “Introduction:  Metaethics and Normative Ethics”, in David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (New York:  Oxford University Press), pp. 3-35.
  • 2006:  Review of Ethics and the A Priori:  Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-ethics, by Michael Smith, in Mind, 115, pp. 476-481.
  • 2005:  “A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism,” Philosophical Studies,126, pp. 269-283.
  • 2005:  “The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 22, pp. 165-203.  Also ch. 10 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 2005:  “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt:  Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45.  Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 2003:  “Why Naturalism?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6, pp. 179-200.  Also ch. 1 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 2003:  “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, Blameworthiness, and Alternate Possibilities”, in David Widerker and Michael McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Press), pp. 265-299.
  • 2002:  “Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon’s Rationalistic Moral Psychology”, Social Theory and Practice, 28, pp. 243-276.  Co-authored with David Sobel.
  • 2002:  “Gert on Reasons, Rationality, Harms, and Lists”, in Walter Sinnott_Armstrong and Robert Audi, eds. Rationality, Rules, And Ideals:  Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory, (Totowa, N.J.:  Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 91-110.
  • 2001:  “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 18, pp. 1-43.  Also ch. 5 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 2001:  “Against Internalism About Reasons – Gert’s Rational Options”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, pp. 455-461.
  • 2001:  “Rationality, Autonomy, and Basic Needs”, in Neil Roughley, ed., Being Humans, (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 334-355.
  • 2001:  “Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire”, Analysis, 61, pp. 44-53.  Co-authored with David Sobel.
  • 2001:  “Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism:  Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 26, pp. 31-74.  Also ch. 2 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 2000:  “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth,” Synthèse, 124, pp. 113-137.  Also ch. 6 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 1999:  “Korsgaard on Normativity, Identity, and the Grounds of Obligation”, in Julian Nida-Rumelin, ed., Rationality, Realism, Revision (Berlin:  de Gruyter), pp. 572-581.
  • 1998:  “Morality and Society - The True and the Nasty: Reply to Leist,” Analyse und Kritik, 20, pp. 30-45.
  • 1998:  “Reasons and Societies: Kurt Baier’s The Rational and the Moral Order”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, pp. 96-102.
  • 1997:  “Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society?” Analyse und Kritik, 19, pp. 189-212.
  • 1997:  “Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility”, Nous, 31, pp. 441-456.
  • 1997:  “Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith’s, The Moral Problem”, Ethics, 108, pp. 33-54.
  • 1997:  “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 14, pp. 86-106.  Also ch. 9 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
  • 1996:  “Moral Knowledge in Society-Centered Moral Theory”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, eds., Moral Knowledge? (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 243-266.
  • 1996:  “Moral Skepticism,” in Donald M. Borchert, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement, (New York: Macmillan), pp. 364-365.
  • 1995.  Morality, Normativity, and Society (New York: Oxford University Press; paperback edition 2001).
  • 1995:  “Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation”, in Kai Nielsen and Jocyelyne Couture, eds., On the Relevance of Metaethics:  New Essays on Metaethics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supp. vol. 21, pp. 187-219.
  • 1994:  Review of Moral Reasons by Jonathan Dancy, in Philosophical Books, 35, pp. 197-199.
  • 1993:  "Reason and Needs", in R.G. Frey and Christopher Morris, eds., Value, Welfare, and Morality (Cambridge University Press), pp. 112-137.
  • 1992:  "The 'Possibility' of a Categorical Imperative:  Kant's Groundwork, Part III", Philosophical Perspectives, 6, 261-284.
  • 1992:  "The Concept of Society", Dialogue, 31, pp. 184-212.
  • 1992:  "Skepticism in Ethics", Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York, Garland Publishing Company), pp. 1156-1159.
  • 1992:  "Meta-ethics", Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York, Garland Publishing Company), pp. 790-798.
  • 1991:  "Moral Realism:  Facts and Norms", Ethics, 101, pp. 610-624.
  • 1991:  "Moral Skepticism", Philosophical Studies, 62, pp. 203-233.
  • 1990:  "Normativity and the Very Idea of Moral Epistemology", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29, Supplement - 1990 Spindel Conference, pp. 189-210.
  • 1990:  "Contractarianism and Moral Skepticism", in Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice:  Essays on Gauthier (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press), pp. 196-228.
  • 1990:  "Explanation and Justification in Ethics", Ethics, 100, pp 237-258.
  • 1989:  Review of Morals by Agreement by David Gauthier, in The Philosophical Review , 98, pp 411-414.
  • 1984:  "Introduction", in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason and Truth:  New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics (Totowa, N.J.:  Rowman and Allanheld), pp 1-24.
  • 1984:  "Considered Judgments and Moral Justification:  Conservatism in Moral Theory", in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason and Truth, pp 141-168.
  • 1982:  "Harman on Internalism, Relativism and Logical Form", Ethics, 92, pp 227-242.

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