Informal Lunchtime Talk : Hsuan-Chih Lin, visiting PhD student from Birkbeck College, University of London

Abstract: My focus here is on the ontology issues about the Russellian singular propositions. Plantinga (1983) argues that it is possible that Socrates does not exist and that the proposition that Socrates does not exist exists, which implies its incompatibility with the Russellian theory of propositions. In order to block the argument, so far there are two responses made by the Russellians. One is a distinction of the inner and the outer notions of truth (Fine 1985), or of a proposition being true in and being true at a world. The other is to argue that it is not possible that Socrates does not exist, i.e. Socrates necessarily exists (Williamson 2002). In this talk, I begin with a characterisation of the Russellian theory of propositions. I argue that the Russellian theory of propositions is not tenable because of Plantinga’s argument. As for the two responses made by the Russellian, I argue that the distinction is either circular or unintelligible, and to embrace necessitism has a similar commitment as the Fregean theory of propositions, which is supposed to be avoided by the Russellian. So to speak, necessitism is incompatible with the Russellian theory of propositions thus conceived. Therefore, I conclude that the Russellian theory of propositions is untenable.