The main goal of Professor Copp’s current research is to develop and defend a general theory of normativity, which he calls pluralist-teleology. The basic idea is set out in “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity” (2009). The society-centered theory of morality that he developed and defended in his first two books illustrates the general idea. The society-centered theory is a realist and naturalist theory of morality. Pluralist-teleology is a realist and naturalist theory of normativity in general. It extends and generalizes the basic idea about normative morality that is developed in the society-centered theory.
The society-centered theory is a version of naturalistic moral realism. t implies that there are moral truths that ascribe moral properties to things and that these properties are a kind of natural property. Many of Professor Copp’s papers defend naturalistic moral realism against objections, such as Derek Parfit’s recent objections. His work has also extended moral realism by pointing out that it can be combined with the view that moral judgments express attitudes, such as moral disapproval.
The society-centered approach to moral theory has informed much of Professor Copp’s work in ethical theory, applied ethics, and political philosophy. Examples are his work on ethical issues about the treatment of non-human animals and his paper on the idea of a legitimate state. He nevertheless defends the standard intuition-driven methodology in moral and political philosophy against objections from “experimental philosophy.”
Professor Copp believes that moral and political philosophy, and especially theories of distributive justice, have not taken proper account of the fact that people have certain basic needs. He has contended that people have reason to seek to meet their basic needs. He has also proposed and defended a principle called the basic needs principle according to which a society in favorable circumstances has a duty of justice to enable its members to meet their basic needs.
Professor Copp has argued that analytic moral and political philosophy does not pay adequate attention to group phenomena. He argues that collective entities such as corporations and states have duties and bear moral responsibility. He is interested in the moral status of nations, such as the Québecois, that do not have the status of a state but that have political aspirations. The members of nations as well as members of other groups typically share a kind of “identity” that can set them apart psychologically from their fellow citizens. This fact presents a challenge to individualistic liberal political philosophy. Professor Copp has provided an account of the relevant notion of identity and he has discussed how liberal political philosophy can be amended to address it.